Conceptual and experiential estrangement of the self - a neo-Fregean elucidation

C W van Staden


Reductionist and non-reductionist philosophers and mental health professionals have debated about what and where the self is. In this article I deploy a neo-Fregean theory to clarify the process by which: (i) the self becomes so susceptible to this debate; and (ii) the self presents so variably in personal experiences. Accordingly, the self can be either estranged or well equipped, depending on the position it occupies in relations, whether in the conceptualisation or in the personal experiences of the self.

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Submitted: 03 March 2008
Published: 01 June 2006

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South African Journal of Psychiatry    |    ISSN: 1608-9685 (PRINT)    |    ISSN: 2078-6786 (ONLINE)